Gerald Ford's Greatest Legacy: John Paul Stevens
As a Congressman, Gerald Ford notoriously stated, in connection with the unsuccessful effort to impeach Justice William O. Douglas, "that an impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives considers [it] to be at a given moment in history." Read in context, this statement was not quite the "might makes right" manifesto which it is often taken to be. (Read Ford's full testimony here.) Nonetheless, because Ford was associated with a perceived attack on the independence of the Supreme Court, he was presented with a delicate situation when Douglas's seat opened up during his Presidency. Ford addressed that opening as a statesman, naming an extremely well regarded moderate: John Paul Stevens.
Although President Ford, may he rest in peace, left the national political stage long before his death, over three decades later, Justice Stevens is still going strong. In June, he authored the Supreme Court's most powerful rebuke of the Bush Administration's assertions of executive power, in the Hamdan case. Although the Military Commissions Act of 2006 reverses the specific outcome of that case, it vindicates the broad principle for which Stevens labored: that the President must seek authority from Congress for military tribunals. In the Rapanos case, his view of the authority of the Army Corps of Engineers under the Clean Water Act essentially won out over the much more restrictive view of the Court's conservatives. More broadly, although Justice Anthony Kennedy clearly holds the balance of power on the Roberts Court as currently constituted, when Kennedy swings liberal, he joins majority opinions of what can best be called the Stevens Court.
To be sure, even though Stevens is one of the most liberal members of the current Court, he was, at the time of his appointment, a moderate. As late as 1989 he voted (with the majority in the Croson case) to invalidate Richmond's affirmative action program and (in dissent in Texas v. Johnson) to uphold a flag-desecration prosecution. Whether Ford anticipated the evolution of Stevens from a moderate to a mostly reliable liberal is, in some ways, beside the point. Republican Presidents who have sought strong ideologues have had little difficulty finding them (as I argue in an article forthcoming in the Harvard Law & Policy Review). Ford chose Stevens knowing that he would exercise independent judgment, which would, in turn, often be used to frustrate policy goals of Republicans. That is to Ford's credit, not because I'm a liberal and so I like Stevens (although I am and I do), but because Ford recognized that, having come to power without having won a majority vote of his fellow citizens, he had an obligation to govern as a centrist. Would that our current President felt the same obligation.
Although President Ford, may he rest in peace, left the national political stage long before his death, over three decades later, Justice Stevens is still going strong. In June, he authored the Supreme Court's most powerful rebuke of the Bush Administration's assertions of executive power, in the Hamdan case. Although the Military Commissions Act of 2006 reverses the specific outcome of that case, it vindicates the broad principle for which Stevens labored: that the President must seek authority from Congress for military tribunals. In the Rapanos case, his view of the authority of the Army Corps of Engineers under the Clean Water Act essentially won out over the much more restrictive view of the Court's conservatives. More broadly, although Justice Anthony Kennedy clearly holds the balance of power on the Roberts Court as currently constituted, when Kennedy swings liberal, he joins majority opinions of what can best be called the Stevens Court.
To be sure, even though Stevens is one of the most liberal members of the current Court, he was, at the time of his appointment, a moderate. As late as 1989 he voted (with the majority in the Croson case) to invalidate Richmond's affirmative action program and (in dissent in Texas v. Johnson) to uphold a flag-desecration prosecution. Whether Ford anticipated the evolution of Stevens from a moderate to a mostly reliable liberal is, in some ways, beside the point. Republican Presidents who have sought strong ideologues have had little difficulty finding them (as I argue in an article forthcoming in the Harvard Law & Policy Review). Ford chose Stevens knowing that he would exercise independent judgment, which would, in turn, often be used to frustrate policy goals of Republicans. That is to Ford's credit, not because I'm a liberal and so I like Stevens (although I am and I do), but because Ford recognized that, having come to power without having won a majority vote of his fellow citizens, he had an obligation to govern as a centrist. Would that our current President felt the same obligation.
15 Comments:
At 11:48 AM,
Orin said…
"Ford recognized that, having come to power without having won a majority vote of his fellow citizens, he had an obligation to govern as a centrist. Would that our current President felt the same obligation."
I'm not sure I find the comparison very persuasive. I have tended to think that Ford's obligation was based not on a sense that he hadn't won a majority of the vote, but rather that he hadn't won any vote at all. As I understand it, he had never even run for national office.
I would think it's a different picture for a President who wins the electoral college without winning a majority vote. So, for example, Clinton didn't win a majority vote in 1992 -- he had 43% of the vote, I believe. But I don't think that meant he an obligation not to do liberal things.
At 12:07 PM,
Marty Lederman said…
I agree with everything you write, Mike -- and more! -- w/r/t JPS, who has become a giant on the Court the past several Terms.
One quibble, which I note only because the misimpression is so common: Contrary to popular belief, Hamdan did *not* hold that "the President must seek authority from Congress for military tribunals." It reserved on that question -- i.e., it assumed arguendo that the President could unilaterally establish such tribunals. What it held was that his particular tribunals violated certain *limitations* that Congress had enacted.
At 12:11 PM,
Sobek said…
Stevens wrote one of the most reprehensible decisions in recent memory, the Kelo v. New London case. It was so bad that even Howard Dean condemned it -- at least until he realized it wasn't written by conservatives. Stevens' callous disregard for property rights in favor of the state and rich developers is at once shocking to small-government conservatives and anti-business liberals.
Other than Kelo, I think Stevens has generally done a dismal job because of his inability to articulate anything like a consistent philosophy. Consider his concurrence in Asahi, which unnecessarily split the Court on personal jurisdiction issues in a 4-4-1 decision.
I have never found anyone who can articulate to me, both coherently and defensibly, a general statement of Stevens' judicial philosophy. I'm interested to read your view on the matter, Prof. Dorf.
At 1:01 PM,
Michael C. Dorf said…
2 thoughts:
1) In response to Marty: It's true that the majority opinion in Hamdan didn't say that the exact tribunals Bush created would be valid if authorized by Congress, but the 4 other Justices in the majority said almost that, and Stevens certainly said that there are SOME military tribunals that would be valid if authorized by Congress but not valid if only authorized by the President.
2) As to Kelo, I understand the extraordinary popular reaction against the decision, but that reaction is, in my view, based on ignorance of the prior law, from which Kelo did not depart, and a failure to think through the consequences of a rule that permits takings for public use only if that public use is carried out by the govt. For an extended version of this argument, see my column at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20050829.html
At 1:09 PM,
Michael C. Dorf said…
One further thought: I agree with Sobek that Stevens' concurrence in Asahi is unhelpful, as is his concurrence in another divided personal jurisdiction case, Burnham. I attribute these concurrences to the propensity for cleverness Stevens exhibited during roughly the first half of his tenure. Once the Court turned decidedly conservative, Stevens seemed to take his job more seriously. As for his overall philosophy, I'd call Stevens a pragmatist--jurisprudentially not different from O'Connor, Breyer or Roberts, for that matter. For those interested in a defense of a pragmatic approach to adjudication, I recommend either Breyer's slim book, Stevens' article on Shakespeare, or some of the hundreds of law review articles (including a few by me) that defend pragmatism. Perhaps the most articulate (and certainly the most prolific) defender of pragmatism as an approach to jurisprudence is Judge Posner, although Stevens is more of a formalist (though still not a formalist) than Posner.
At 1:11 PM,
Michael C. Dorf said…
and finally, in response to Orin's point, I think Clinton DID govern as a centrist: welfare reform, balancing the budget, judicial appointments. If Clinton had gone as far to the left as Bush 2 has gone to the right on judicial appts, he'd have named judges like Stephen Reinhardt to the Supreme Court, rather than Ginsburg and Breyer, who were widely understood to be centrists. Whether Clinton did all of this because he won less than a majority, I agree, is unknown. Clinton himself was a centrist. Then again, Bush 2 campaigned as a "uniter."
At 1:13 PM,
Marty Lederman said…
Actually, I think the majority opinion in Hamdan came fairly close to saying that the tribunals Bush created would be valid if authorized by Congress -- it didn't suggest any constitutional problems, in any event.
If Congress authorized Bush's tribunals, then that authorization would *supersede* the limits Congress had previously imposed -- and it was those limits that governed the case.
As for Stevens saying "that there are SOME military tribunals that would be valid if authorized by Congress but not valid if only authorized by the President" -- really? Where did he say that? I didn't read the opinion that way. Yes, *once Congress has made some tribunals off-limits,* then the President cannot implement such tribunals unilaterally. But does Stevens ever suggest that there are some tribunals that the President could not implement where Congress has been silent? As I read it, he avoids that question.
I agree completely on Kelo, though.
At 1:52 PM,
Howard Wasserman said…
Another consideration on the absence of popular presidential majorities:
Any time Clinton seemed to think about doing something that seemed liberal (think of the nominations of Bill Lan Lee or Lani Guinier, as two small examples), congressional Republicans continually and loudly reminded everyone that Clinton had not won a popular majority and should not make such a partisan move. No such complaints were heard when Bush (whose Electoral College win in 2000 was hair-thin compared with Clinton's in 1992) moved to the right, especially on judicial appointments.
At 3:28 PM,
Michael C. Dorf said…
Marty and I should probably take this discussion of the esoterica of Hamdan off-list if we're going to continue it. I'll just add here that my prior point was simply an inelegant way of stating that, GIVEN the law on the books (UCMJ), the President could not authorize military comm'ns on his own unless they met the criteria of the UCMJ (incorporating the law of war). To get other sorts of military commn's, the President would have to go back to Congress. So I think we agree.
What's curious (and this is, I promise, the last thing I'll say about this) is that all 4 Justices who join Stevens in whole or in part, say (through Breyer's concurrence) that Congress could authorize the Bush commissions. Breyer says: "Nothing prevents the President from returning to Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary." Now maybe Breyer (and Kennedy, Souter and Ginsburg) meant only that Bush could go back to Congress and then come back to the Court, but that seems an odd reading. So if Marty is right that Stevens has reserved the question of constitutionality, by not joining the Breyer concurrence, he has only reserved it for himself, not for his majority. Okay, enough about that.
At 3:48 PM,
Sobek said…
"...rather than Ginsburg and Breyer, who were widely understood to be centrists."
Are you referring to Ruth Bader Ginsburg? As in, former ACLU lawyer Ruther Bader Ginsburg?
At 3:58 PM,
Marty Lederman said…
Yes, we agree! And I think SGB does, too -- what he means, in my view, is simply that if Bush wanted Congress to waive the preexisting UCMJ limitations, it could ask the legislature to do so.
Thanks.
At 4:17 PM,
Orin said…
Michael writes:
If Clinton had gone as far to the left as Bush 2 has gone to the right on judicial appts, he'd have named judges like Stephen Reinhardt to the Supreme Court, rather than Ginsburg and Breyer, who were widely understood to be centrists.
I thought the question was whether Clinton had an "obligation" to govern as a centrist, not whether he ended up doing so. It's been a while, but didn't Clinton initially want to put someone like Mario Cuomo on the Court, to have abother Brennan-esque figure? My recollection is that by the time Clinton made his picks, he was considered too politically weak to put the kind of Justice he wanted to on the Court. I see that as the reality of politics, not a question of Clinton's obligation as a President elected with less than 50% of the popular vote.
At 4:19 PM,
Orin said…
I should also add that under your theory, Bush had no obligation to nominate a centrist to the Supreme Court openings that he has faced: both nominations were made in Bush's second term, after he was re-elected with the majority vote.
At 5:15 PM,
Michael C. Dorf said…
To respond to the last 2 questions and then I'll get off this thread:
1) Ginsburg was indeed a liberal lawyer but she was seen as a centrist during her many years on the DC Circuit. Mikva, Edwards and Wald were the liberals.
2) I agree that Bush's obligation, if any, to appoint moderates, weakened in his second term. I made this point more broadly in my "open letter" to him last week. On the core point, though, I guess i'm of the view that any President whose philosophy and party haven't won a landslide, should generally appoint centrists. FDR was the last President with a mandate to truly change the courts. (Reagan, who won large electoral victories but whose party didn't take over Congress, is an interesting counterpoint.)
At 6:54 PM,
Sobek said…
"...he was considered too politically weak to put the kind of Justice he wanted to on the Court."
Breyer and Ginsburg were his "weak" picks? If that's weakness ... just damn.
"Reagan, who won large electoral victories but whose party didn't take over Congress, is an interesting counterpoint."
Reagan is an interesting counterpoint. With the two largest landslides I'll see in my lifetime, he appointed Scalia (a hard-core conservative), Kennedy (a moderate who seems to be drifting leftward) and O'Connor (who I can only describe as an O'Connorist).
If anything, I suggest that indicates how little America (other than lawyers and professors) has paid attention to the Court since ... well, since FDR, as you said. And that, in turn, might suggest that Court decisions have become increasingly intrusive, and therefore prominent. When the Court is more deferential, ideology makes less of a difference.
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